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Introduction
“Death is the wish of some, the relief of many, and the end of all.”
Seneca (4 BC- AD 65)1
The Pretty v. the United Kingdom case: beginnings of the discussion 
on the European level
To what extent does a person have autonomy over one’s own body? Are 
states obliged to protect the right to life even against the will of the person whose 
life they are preserving? Does a person who is permanently paralysed from the 
neck down, with no decipherable speech and fed through a tube, have a right to 
request the ending of her or his own life? These were some of the questions that 
arose for the first time before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
the case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom.2 Mrs. Pretty, the applicant, was suffer-
ing from motor neurone disease (MND) and no existing treatment could prevent 
the progression of the disease. Eventually, the advanced stage of the MND left 
her paralysed from the neck down with virtually no decipherable speech, and a 
life expectancy measurable only in weeks or months. Nevertheless, her intellec-
tual capacity was unimpaired, and she knew that the final stages of the disease 
were going to be extremely distressing and undignified. Frightened and upset 
at the suffering and indignity that she might endure if the disease was to run its 
course, Mrs. Pretty wished to control how and when she died and spare herself 
from the ache and humiliation of a slow death. Since she was unable to end her 
life by her own hands,3 Mrs. Pretty’s husband was willing to assist his wife. How-
ever, upon making inquiries about this to the Director of Public Prosecutions, it 
was clear that Mr. Pretty would not be exempted from prosecution if he was to 
act in accordance with her wishes.4 Consequently, Mrs. Pretty argued that the 
refusal in her case violated fundamental rights under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR),5 and eventually ended up challenging the UK’s legis-
lation before the ECtHR.
1 Seneca, L. A., & ReinhaRdt, T. (2008). Dialogues and essays. Oxford University Press, p. 51.
2 Pretty v. the UK, 2346/02, ECtHR, 29 April 2002.
3 Suicide was, and still is, legal under English law. Pretty v. the UK § 9.
4 Prosecution under S. 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961.
5 Mrs. Pretty argued that the legislation was in violation with Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 & 14 of the ECHR.
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Regardless of the judgement, which found no violation of any right under 
the ECHR, this case illustrated the social, ethical and religious dilemmas as to 
whether the terminally ill should be free to seek assistance in taking their own 
lives. Ultimately, if euthanasia and assisted dying (EAD) were to be legalized in 
national legislation, would it be feasible to encompass all the possible circum-
stances surrounding patients and to provide sufficient safeguards to prevent 
abuse? These questions, on which widely differing beliefs and views are strongly 
held,6 have now been the subject of a discussion in several cases before the 
ECtHR, but the debate still seems to be at a stalemate. European states aiming 
to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of 
the community, in particular between the principle of self-determination and the 
principle of the sanctity of human life, approach the issue differently and make 
European consensus on this question unlikely to emerge.7 In addition to that, the 
strong division between scholars points out that there is a case to be made both 
for prohibition of EAD, as well as its legalisation.8 Personal autonomy and relief of 
suffering are certainly values that underlie human dignity and accordingly human 
rights,9 but it is also true that the issue of EAD is one in which the interest of the 
individual cannot be separated from the interest of society as a whole.10 Dying is 
not only a personal or individual affair, but the death of a person also affects the 
lives of others in various ways. Consequently, it becomes clear that with regards 
to the issue in question, autonomy and the interest of the society are often per-
ceived as mutually exclusive. This shows the delicacy of the matter and some of 
the potential challenges states might face in their balancing exercises.
The social, ethical and religious dilemmas, the absence of a European con-
sensus,11 and the very valid points for and against legalisation of EAD, function as 
a starting point for further exploration. Given the increasing likeliness that cases 
concerning this matter will only become more prevalent in the future, as well as 
the impact this discussion might have on the lives of people, there are several 
legal issues which ought to be explored to determine the desired outcome. This 
paper will tackle a few of these legal issues in hope to contribute useful insight 
as to how the ECtHR should approach this topic.
6 Compare the third-party comments in Pretty v. the UK from the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (§§ 25- 
-27) to the ones from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales (§§ 28-31).
7 PuPPinck G. & de La hougue c. (2014) p. 743.
8 For example, Somerville argues that legalizing euthanasia would cause irreparable harm to society’s 
value of respect for human life in SomeRviLLe, m. (2014) pp. 3-9, whilst Dworkin asserts that autonomy and 
relief of suffering are the values that should prevail in dwoRkin, g., FRey, R. g., & Bok, S. (1998) pp. 2-5.
9 dwoRkin, g., FRey, R. g., & Bok, S. (1998) pp. 3-5.
10 SomeRviLLe, m. (2014) pp. 5-9.
11 This means that the states parties to CoE have different (non) regulations in place.
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Scope of the paper and formulation of the research question
“What I fear is a death that negates, as opposed to concludes, my life. […] 
I do not want to waste away unconscious in a hospital bed. I do not want to die 
wracked with pain.”12 These words by Ms. Taylor,13 found in a landmark decision 
by the Canadian Supreme Court, represent the essence of what this paper aims 
to discuss. The judgment serves as an inspiration to examine the legal possi-
bilities and obstacles under the ECHR for terminally ill people who wish to end 
their lives via EAD. This paper approaches the conflict between individual auton-
omous choices and the self-worth of human life in general from the standpoint of 
human dignity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) makes clear 
that human dignity has a fundamental role in respect of all human rights.14 Sev-
eral United Nations (UN) documents also unequivocally state that human rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.15 Although the ECHR does 
not explicitly refer to human dignity, there is little doubt that it is regarded as an 
underlying principle by the ECtHR.16 This idea of dignity of human life is particu-
larly challenged in the scenario where a person is forced to linger on in old age 
and/or in states of advanced physical or mental incapacitation, which go against 
strongly held ideas of self and personal identity.17 As a consequence, the search 
for dignity in dying is pursued by both advocates and opponents of EAD.18 The 
challenge is thus to determine whether adopting the standpoint of human dignity 
invokes a right to EAD or not.
This issue is complex because whilst it is morally contested,19 it is also a 
practically pressing need within the scope of personal autonomy of the indi-
vidual.20 However, there are very few cases regarding EAD in the sphere of in-
ternational human rights law (IHRL), and all of them have been heard before 
the ECtHR.21 The ECHR, as a living instrument,22 is a very suitable candidate 
12 SCC, Carter v. Canada, 2015 SCC 5, 1 S.C.R. 331 § 12.
13 G. Taylor was suffering from ALS. ALS patients first lose the ability to use their hands and feet, then 
the ability to chew, swallow, speak and, eventually, breathe. Carter v. Canada § 11.
14 UDHR, Preamble.
15 UN Charter, Preamble as well as other major UN human rights treaties. ICESCR and ICCPR both state 
in their Preambles that all human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.
16 The ECtHR’ reliance upon human dignity as a guiding principle can be seen most clearly in its inter-
pretation of Art. 3. Tyrer v. the UK, 5856/72, ECtHR, 15 March 1978; Also see mccRudden, c. (2008).
17 Pretty v. the UK § 65.
18 wickS, e. (2012) p. 213.
19 aRRaS, J. d. (1996) p. 368.
20 PuPPinck g. & de La hougue C. (2014) p. 738.
21 The ECtHR has discussed the issue in five cases.
22 This means that the ECHR must be interpreted according to present-day conditions. LetSaS, g. (2013) 
p. 1-2.
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to tackle the problem and to provide a comprehensive approach due to the 
divergent solutions adopted by the Contracting Parties of the Council of Eu-
rope (CoE).23 Ergo, the exclusivity of the ECtHR jurisprudence on this matter, 
the general characteristics of the ECHR, and the variety of views on EAD among 
European states, are adequate reasons to limit the scope of this paper only to 
the contents of the ECHR.
Several Articles of the Convention could be used as a basis on which to build 
a case to include a right to EAD under the ECHR.24 The right to life as defined in 
Article 2 of the ECHR25 is the first obvious choice since one could argue that this 
right also includes the right not to live.26 Nonetheless, the analysis would not be 
able to cover the whole debate surrounding this matter since some of the points 
fall outside of the scope of the Article. For example, the arguments regarding 
personal autonomy, as well as the ones concerning morality, would either be 
omitted from the examination or construed in such a way to shift the discussion 
to the right to life rather than to the choice being made in these situations. Since 
this is as likely to happen with any of the other Articles that could be triggered 
in different situations, such as Articles 3, 9 and/or 14, it is only Article 8 of the 
ECHR that can sufficiently cover the standpoint of human dignity as part of the 
right to private and family life.27 Article 8 of the ECHR comprehensively incorpo-
rates both sides of the human dignity argument, as well as the entire ‘right to 
die’ debate.28 The respect for private life could be used to encompass the moral 
foundation of the potential right to choose how to die. On the other hand, the 
limitations of the right incorporate the morality and the sanctity of human life 
arguments. Considering that dying is a part of life and how one dies is a vital 
aspect of how that individual has lived his or her life, the process of dying fits 
into the scope of private and family life in the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR.29
Hence, this paper aims to answer the following research question:
23 3 states have legalized EAD, 1 has legalized ass. dying but has prohibited euthanasia, and the rest 
of the states have either made EAD illegal or leave the matter unregulated. PuPPinck g. & de La hougue c. 
(2014) p. 736.
24 Mrs. Pretty argued the case based on Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 & 14 of the ECHR.
25 ECHR, Art. 2(1).
26 For example, Art 11 (Freedom of assembly and association) also confers a right not to join an associ-
ation. See Young, James and Webster v. the UK, 7601/76; 7806/77, 4 EHRR 38, 18 October 1982.
27 This is thoroughly explained in keown, J. (2003) pp. 724-725.
28 Pretty v. the UK § 65.
29 wickS, e. (2012) p. 214.
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To what extent can (based on feasibility from a human dignity 
perspective, current interpretation methods and case-law) eutha-
nasia and assisted dying be read into Article 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights?
The paper aims to test whether these morally diverging views within Europe, 
that lead countries to regulate the issue differently, could be unified in a direction 
offered by IHRL. Namely, to answer the question if human rights law, with an em-
phasis on human dignity, offers a direction for the moral discussion, a mandate 
or even an obligation for states to regulate the obligations arising from the ECHR 
in this aspect. To clarify the scope of this paper and to precisely indicate its aim, 
a brief description of the main components of the research question will follow.
Primarily, euthanasia and assisted dying are very similar in the sense that 
they both lead to the same result-death, but the processes themselves differ 
in several aspects.30 Euthanasia is generally defined as an act, undertaken only 
by a physician, that intentionally ends the life of a person at his or her request.31 
On the other hand, assisted dying is constituted when a person self-adminis-
ters a lethal substance prescribed by a physician.32 Ergo, the main difference 
is that euthanasia compels the physician both to prescribe and administer the 
lethal substance, while assisted dying may have different forms, but as a rule 
requires only prescription from the physician.33 Nonetheless, this paper will be 
using EAD defined as the situation in which a doctor ends the life of a person 
who is suffering unbearably (without any prospect of improvement) at the latter’s 
explicit request.34 To be more exact, the ending of the life in this paper shall be 
understood to occur in a way of administering a lethal injection, and the explicit 
request would have to be made by the person that is going to be subjected to 
EAD.35 The suffering could be physical and/or mental and must be characterized 
by a physician as unbearable in order to fit under the definition.36
30 dixon, n. (1998) p. 25.
31 PeReiRa J. (2011) p. 38.
32 Ibid.
33 This distinction is accepted as the most common throughout the academic literature. QuiLL e. t., 
caSSeL k.c., and meieR e.d. (1992) pp. 1381-1383.
34 This definition is used by many authors and is mostly based on the Dutch perspective. For example, 
it is used throughout gRiFFithS, J., Bood, a., & weyeRS, h. (2010) pp. 17-18.
35 diaconeScu, a. (2012) pp. 474-475.
36 For example, such is the case with the Dutch law, Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Dying 
Act – Upper House. Parliamentary year 2000-2001, 26 691, no 137, April 1, 2002, Art. 2(b).
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Moreover, EAD will be treated as the same for the purposes of this paper.37 
Acknowledging the differences between EAD,38 and the fact that many in the 
medical community may disagree,39 a unified definition of EAD is necessary and 
sufficient to answer the research question. Necessary because that is the only 
way to gather enough information to provide more space for substantive ar-
guments at the expense of the technicalities of the forms and sufficient from a 
legal perspective as differences between the processes do not affect the ‘can’ 
parameter.
Secondly, the assessment criteria will analyse the contentious issues through 
confrontation of the two principles via a human dignity lenses. The test will be 
whether the key element of the principle of self-determination,40 the choice to die 
as part of the right to respect for private and family life,41 is more dignified than 
the morality elements of the principle of the sanctity of human life.42 Hence, the 
yardstick is the coherence between human dignity as underlying principle to the 
right to private and family life and the right itself.43 Specifically, the clash between 
the individual and the human dignity of life in general, demonstrated through the 
belief of a society as a whole that human dignity is always attacked whenever 
someone decides to undergo EAD, shall provide the answer.
Finally, the evaluation based on current interpretation methods and case-law 
is relevant to decide if the ECtHR, realistically speaking, would ever read EAD 
into the ECHR. Current methods include evolutive interpretation and interpreta-
tion via European consensus.44 Evolutive interpretation is a tool that provides the 
ECtHR with a degree of flexibility to ensure the realisation of the rights protected 
under the ECHR and to keep up with important social changes.45 On the other 
hand, the European consensus may be defined as a general agreement among 
the majority of member states of the CoE about certain rules and principles.46 
This means that the paper will take into account both the dynamic interpretation 
by the Court, as well as the Margin of Appreciation (MoA) granted to the states.47 
37 This approach is also taken by gRiFFithS, J., weyeRS, h., adamS, m., & adamS, M. (2008).
38 QuiLL, t. e., Lo, B., & BRock, d. w. (2008) pp. 49-64.
39 RietJenS, J. a., van deLden, J. J., van deR heide, a., vRakking, a. m., onwuteaka-PhiLiPSen, B. d., van deR 
maaS, P. J., & van deR waL, g. (2006) pp. 749 & 752.
40 wickS, e. (2001), p. 17.
41 Pretty v. the UK § 67.
42 RakowSki, e. (1994), p. 2102-2117.
43 BRemS, e. (2008) p. 620.
44 dzehtSiaRou, k. (2011) pp. 1731-1734.
45 Vo v. France, 53924/00, ECtHR, 8 July 2004 § 82.
46 dzehtSiaRou, k. (2011) p. 534.
47 Some authors approach the European consensus as a mediator between dynamic interpretation and 
the MoA but this will not be the case in this paper. See moRawa, a. h. (2002).
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Lastly, this paper will be strictly legal and will not consider issues that are not 
based on legal grounds apart from the discussion on human dignity. Although 
some of these issues, such as ECtHR judges’ ideologies, might be very impor-
tant and even decisive in the debate, it is not possible to include them as that 
would become an endeavour too large for this paper.
Methodology and structure
The debate on EAD between those supporting its legalization and those who 
are opposed to it may seem to be well established.48 However, adopting a spe-
cific angle in the theoretical framework that encompasses all these viewpoints is 
still a challenge. The introduction has so far delineated the scope and goal of this 
paper and has placed the research within the relevant context, consequently the 
paper will now proceed to set out the structure to guide the reader as to what 
can be expected in terms of methods and analysis.
The research for this paper will be conducted through a qualitative analysis, 
as an appropriate method of research for this type of topic, of several sources.49 
The paper will examine case-law from the ECtHR as the main type of source 
and it will combine it with academic literature. The studies that currently exist 
regarding this issue are mostly focused on analysing EAD through Article 2 of the 
ECHR.50 A smaller proportion of the literature examines the protection of EAD 
in the light of Article 8 of the ECHR,51 but almost none of it focuses on human 
dignity in a sufficient manner.52 The approach this research will take differs from 
the existing studies as it will analyse both Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, as well 
as EAD, using human dignity as a starting point. The different studies on this 
topic will be used to provide a rather global overview of the state of the art. What 
this paper is looking to add is a critical examination of Article 8 of the ECHR, as 
well as an analysis of what human dignity requires states to do when discussing 
private choices as to the way one wishes to die.
After a brief introductory section on the necessity to discuss EAD at the inter-
national level, three additional sections will follow. The second section will delve 
into the analysis of human dignity as part of the EAD debate and Articles 2 and 
8 of the ECHR together. Here, the argumentation will point out the differences 
48 dixon, n, pp. 25-29 & PeReiRa J. (2011), p. 38.
49 Law, m & others (1998) p. 2.
50 PuPPinck g. & de La hougue c. (2014).
51 chRiStoPheR mccRudden (2008).
52 This is also claimed in wickS e., (2012) pp. 213-216.
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between the protection under different Articles of the ECHR, and explain why 
the case under Article 8 would be the strongest. Moreover, section three will 
focus on the line of development of the issue of EAD in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, and mainly analyse the case-law and the Articles of the ECHR which are 
the basis for the cases. Important cases that will be used in the third section, 
together with academic literature, are: Pretty v. the United Kingdom (2002),53 
Haas v. Switzerland (2011),54 Koch v. Germany (2012),55 Gross v. Switzerland 
(2013),56 and Lambert and Others v. France (2015).57 Having provided the basis 
of the research in the two preceding sections, the fourth section will move on to 
examine human dignity in light of Article 8 of the ECHR. The division between 
sections three and four will show the difference between the existing and the 
desirable situation.  Hence, Article 8 of the ECHR and its scope will be studied 
in-depth in the fourth section. The links between human dignity, EAD, and the 
right to private and family life should already become apparent by sections two 
and three. The fourth section will also discuss how European States should deal 
with these developments, and if the development is desirable.
Finally, the conclusion will draw together the final observations and show 
how these findings differ from the state of the art. The paper will tackle and 
answer how the focus on human dignity in life can, or cannot, be used as a justi-
fication for the tolerance of a freedom to choose death at one’s own hands on a 
principled level in the context of the ECHR. Ultimately, the paper can serve as a 
legal exercise to test the boundaries, the beginnings and the endings, between 
individual bodily autonomy and state obligations.
Section 1.  The Necessity to Discuss Euthanasia and Assisted 
Dying
The following introductory section first presents the current legal situation in 
IHRL with regards to EAD, and then emphasises the necessity of an internation-
al, namely European, discussion on the matter. The section concludes with a 
consideration of the initial problems this approach may bring.
53 Pretty v. the UK.
54 Haas v. Switzerland, 31322/07, ECtHR, 20 January 2011.
55 Koch v. Germany, 497/09, ECtHR, 19 July 2012.
56 Gross v. Switzerland, 67810/10, ECtHR, 14 May 2013.
57 Lambert and Others v. France, 46043/14, ECtHR, 5 June 2015.
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1.1 The legal status quo of euthanasia and assisted dying
At the date of writing, four member states of the CoE permit some form 
of assisted dying: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland.58 
Other states have seen numerous domestic cases challenging the prohibition of 
EAD on the basis of the ECHR directly and/or the national legislation.59 Although 
assisting or encouraging suicide remains a criminal offence in most of the Eu-
ropean countries,60 cases like Nicklinson before the UK Supreme Court,61 and 
Fleming before the Irish Supreme Court,62 show that this question is far from 
settled.63 The two Courts delivered judgements that dismissed the applications, 
but their reasoning seems to allow space for interpretation on both sides as to 
the direction in which the jurisprudence might develop.64 This brings to light a 
question regarding the status of EAD in IHRL.
Opponents of EAD claim that IHRL tends to condemn EAD related practices 
by sanctioning the right to life in the human rights treaties.65 The explanation is 
that these practices are a form of murder,66 and since states have a positive obli-
gation to ensure that a person’s life is not arbitrarily taken by private individuals,67 
it can be concluded that EAD are incompatible with the right to life.68 While it is 
indeed true that the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has expressed its concern 
regarding uncontrolled practices,69 and that some Conventions disallow such 
actions without consent,70 there is neither explicit nor implicit complete prohibi-
tion of EAD in international or regional human rights law. The fact that interna-
tional and regional bodies distinguish between arbitrary deprivation of life and 
58 maRtin, S. S. (2018) p. 244. Outside of Europe, there are additional nine jurisdictions that permit some 
form of EAD: California, Canada, Columbia, Colorado, District of Columbia, Oregon, Vermont, Victoria 
(Australia) and Washington State.
59 Ibid., p. 246.
60 Ibid., pp. 273-274.
61 Two judges claimed that prohibition is incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.
62 There was clear reluctance from the Supreme Court to examine the requirements under Art. 8(2) of the 
ECHR.
63 The same applies to academia, compare PeRkinS, h. S. (2016) with RoScoe, L. a., & Schenck, d. P. 
(2017).
64 Nicklinson §§ 163 & 164 and Fleming § 159.
65 Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR, Art. 2 ECHR, Art. 4 ACHR, Art. 4 ACHPR & Art. 6 CRC.
66 aLteRS, S. m. (2009) pp. 13-17.
67 FocaReLLi c. (2013 § 23.
68 Ibid. §§ 23 & 24.
69 HRC’s comment on the Netherlands in UNHRC, Concluding observations: Netherlands, 2009 § 7.
70 The combination of Articles 25(f) & 10 of the CRPD prohibits forms of eugenic and economic eutha-
nasia.
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assisted dying in their decisions and documents,71 clearly shows that EAD in the 
meaning of this paper are not considered a form of murder. On the contrary, the 
ECtHR has stated that it is not excluding that a prohibition of a person’s choice 
to avoid what he or she considers will be an undignified and distressing death, 
might constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 of the ECHR.72 This, together with the reality that countries which allow 
for EAD are not found to be in violation of international or regional human rights 
law, leads to the conclusion that EAD are not inherently contrary to the right to 
life or any other right under current IHRL.   
Therefore, the legal status of EAD under current IHRL is ambiguous, and it 
should be explored in order to clarify whether any state obligations are arising 
from its (non) regulation. While national solutions vary, some domestic Courts 
do not take hard stances on the issue and seem to welcome suggestions and 
guidance on the matter. This leaves space to approach the issue from a regional 
and/or international perspective.
1.2 Possibility, necessity and relevance of a European discussion
So far, the ECtHR has not ruled that a law prohibiting EAD is incompatible 
with any of the Articles of the ECHR,73 but likewise it has not stated that a law 
authorizing EAD is inherently irreconcilable with one or more of the ECHR pro-
visions either.74 Hence, to set the basis for the paper, it is essential to scrutinize 
the ECtHR rationale in the EAD related case-law, see if it shows that EAD are 
covered by a certain provision of the ECHR, and if it is possible to have the dis-
cussion on a European level.
Primarily, the ECtHR acknowledged that Article 8 of the ECHR might apply 
to EAD,75 which means that any interference with this choice, such as prohibition 
of EAD, must pursue a legitimate aim to be able to limit the right to respect for 
private life. In the specific cases under consideration, the ECtHR found that the 
challenged laws were proportional measures to ensure the attainment of the le-
gitimate aim of protecting the rights of others, particularly of the most vulnerable 
people in society.76 However, the Court did not rule out that under other circum-
71 See Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of CoE, Rec. No. 779 & Pretty v. the UK § 65.
72 Pretty v. the UK § 67.
73 Ibid. §§ 38-42.
74 Ibid. § 42.
75 Pretty v. the UK § 65.
76 Haas v. Switzerland § 56.
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stances, disallowing EAD might be incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.77 
Since it is admitted that Article 8 of the ECHR applies to EAD, the ECtHR rea-
soning in these cases is essentially a balancing exercise between the right to 
respect for private life, on one hand, and other fundamental rights, including 
the right to life, on the other. This leaves open the possibility, and from a human 
dignity perspective also the necessity and the relevance, to read a potential ‘right 
to die’ into Article 8 of the ECHR.
Secondly, the necessity to have this discussion on a regional level stems 
from the inclusive protection of human dignity under the ECHR.78 The focus on 
human dignity will offer a direction for the development of comparative national 
legislation in the Member States of the CoE, that complies with the ECHR and 
the principles underlying it. Contrarily, allowing a wide MoA would keep the dis-
cussion at national level, with states being able to uphold their current legisla-
tion, regardless if they allow EAD or not, and ignoring their potential obligations 
regarding the right to respect private life.
Finally, the increasing number of EAD-related cases being brought before 
national courts and the ECtHR, demonstrates the high relevance of the discus-
sion today.79 The importance of the discussion’s outcome for the people who 
wish to end their lives, as well as their families, the strong division on the matter 
between the ones supporting EAD and the ones opposing it, and the attention 
attracted by news on this issue, all add up to the relevance of the debate.80
1.3 Initial problems and concerns in a nutshell
Focusing on the ECHR may render this paper unable to reach a straight- 
forward conclusion due to the unpredictability of the doctrine of MoA, even 
though the MoA will be considered throughout the paper. Elements such as 
the stage of the illness, the patient’s determination, family circumstances, the 
precise wording of the law at issue, and its actual implementation can decisively 
influence the outcome of a judicial argument.81 If all possible solutions were to 
be taken into account, the discussion would result in the ECtHR keeping a wide 
MoA, and not moving too far from the status quo. Ergo, it is important to note 
that even though this paper will be able to conduct the academic exercise and 
77 FocaReLLi c. (2013) § 42.
78 conneLLy, a. m. (1986) pp. 574-575.
79 For example, in the period of 2000-2010 and before that, the ECtHR had delivered only 1 judgement 
on EAD, after 2010, that number increased to 5 judgements. Factsheet – End of life and the ECHR.
80 In May 2018 a story about 104-year old Australian scientist travelling to Switzerland to end his life 
attracted a significant level of public interest, see https://bbc.in/2Ie3jPf.
81 FocaReLLi c. (2013) § 42.
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analyse whether legally speaking EAD are covered under the ECHR, the ‘can’ 
part of the research question is also variable according to the circumstances of 
a particular case.82
Section 2.  Human Dignity, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Euthanasia and Assisted Dying
Currently, there is no formulation of human dignity as a substantive explicit 
right in any of the operative provisions in the human rights Conventions.83 In-
stead, human dignity is often found in the Conventions’ preambles and is used 
as an underlying principle in combination with other guarantees and prohibi-
tions.84 This is also the case with the ECHR where dignity is mentioned only 
once, in the preamble of Protocol No. 13,85 but the ECtHR has used it regularly 
when discussing potential violations of Articles of the ECHR.86 The cases of Vo 
v. France and Bock v. Germany are good illustrations for this in relation to Article 
2 and Article 8 respectively.
Namely, in Vo v. France, the ECtHR argued that the mere capacity to be-
come a person, among other things, was sufficient to be vested with dignity so 
that unborn life could already be considered as a bearer of human dignity.87 Re-
gardless of the discussion whether this leads to the consequence of the embryo 
being also protected by the right to life or not, the important part is that the Court 
explicitly recognized human dignity as a factor within Article 2 of the ECHR. 
Additionally, in the case of Bock v. Germany, the ECtHR found that a nine-years 
long divorce procedure, which put into question the applicant’s mental capacity, 
infringed upon the applicant’s dignity and violated his guarantee of private life 
as laid down in Article 8 of the ECHR.88 Thus, the Court made clear that human 
dignity is likewise an element of Article 8 of the ECHR, and ought to be taken into 
account when considering potential violations.
Hence, in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, human dignity is used to justify 
the right to life and the right to respect for private life, and/or simply to stress their 
importance.89 As a result, the proponents of EAD argue for human dignity mani-
82 weRth JR, J. L., & BLevinS, d. (eds.) pp. 158-160.
83 PeteRSen n. (2012) § 6.
84 UDHR, Preamble & Articles 1, 22 & 23.
85 ECHR, Preamble to Protocol No. 13.
86 Vo v. France § 84 & Bock v. Germany, 1/1988/145/199, ECtHR, 29 March 1989 § 48.
87 Vo v. France § 84.
88 Bock v. Germany § 48.
89 PeteRSen n. (2012) § 19.
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fested in the right to choose when and how to die, while the opponents contend 
for dignity expressed through the principle of sanctity of life. Considering that by 
now it is apparent how dignity in dying is pursued by both advocates and op-
ponents of EAD, it is necessary to clarify the role human dignity plays regarding 
Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR.
2.1 Human dignity, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and EAD
Article 2(1) of the ECHR reads:
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sen-
tence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.”
Article 2(2) then continues to list the limited circumstances in which a per-
son can be deprived of this right, but none of these relate to EAD. The wording 
clearly shows that the primary obligation of a State is negative, which means that 
it is a duty to abstain from violating a person’s right to life.90 Nonetheless, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence has developed the ‘doctrine of positive obligations’ that 
compels States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within 
its jurisdiction, even when the right is threatened by third parties or activities 
that are not directly connected to the State.91 Although there are still gaps in the 
interpretation and application of Article 2,92 the ECtHR has made clear several 
issues regarding human dignity.
First, the Court has consistently emphasized the fundamental nature of the 
right to life and has stated that Article 2, together with Article 3 of the ECHR, 
enshrines one of the basic values of the European States.93 The willingness of 
the ECtHR to find a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR even in situations where 
there has been no loss of life at all,94 suggests that the right to life also protects 
the sanctity of life in general, as well as the respect for all human life.95 This 
90 Scheinin m. (2012) p. 28.
91 Scheinin m. (2012) p. 28.
92 wickS, e. (2012) p. 201.
93 McCann v. the UK, 18984/91, ECtHR, 27 September 1995 § 147.
94 Makaratzis v. Greece, 50385/99, ECtHR, 20 December 2004.
95 wickS, e. (2012) p. 202.
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means that the interpretation of the right to life considers the sanctity of life as 
a foundation of Article 2 of the ECHR. Some authors argue that protecting ‘life 
with dignity’ as opposed to ‘sanctity of life’ may represent ‘a fuller reflection of 
life’,96 and if that theory is to be adopted by the Court, EAD would easily find its 
place into the ECHR. Nevertheless, the ECtHR in its current reasoning prioritizes 
the sanctity of life over a life with dignity and thus makes it very unlikely to under-
stand EAD as establishing an obligation for States to provide a right to choose 
when and how to die under Article 2 of the ECHR.
Second, in abortion cases, such as Vo v. France and A, B, C v. Ireland, the 
ECtHR use of dignity as the underlying principle of the right to life seems to derive 
from an idea of human dignity innate in humanity itself, rather than the individual 
human being.97 The nature of life in the Court’s words is perceived to be based 
on profound moral values that are inherent to human life generally,98 and has little 
to do with the specific features of the life in question. As such, human dignity is 
not considered to be the decisive element in the reasoning whether there has 
been a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR, and the best example to illustrate this 
is the case of Vo v. France. Here, the Court claimed that the embryo requires 
protection in the name of human dignity generally, but still found no violation of 
Article 2 of the ECHR in the specific case. Similarly, it would be very challenging 
to fit individual autonomous choices regarding the end of life into such a general 
idea of human dignity. Even more so, if one agrees with the beliefs that these 
choices might sometimes threaten the dignity of human life in general,99 and that 
premature end to life and/or the involvement of state officials and private individ-
uals in killing a human being always violates human dignity.
Last, the ECtHR approach towards human dignity where there is a conflict 
between the right to life and the right to respect for private life is unclear. So far, 
the ECtHR has excluded the entitlement to choose death rather than life under 
Article 2 of the ECHR with the explanation that the Article cannot be interpreted 
as conferring the diametrically opposite right.100 This discards Article 2 as an 
option for EAD under the ECHR. However, the Court has also pointed out that 
the intrinsic value in human life is just one of the elements to be assessed, and 
that it could be overridden by other considerations present in a case.101 Since 
96 duPRé, c. (2009) p. 200.
97 wickS, e. (2012) p. 209.
98 A, B, C v. Ireland, 25579/05, ECtHR, 16 December 2010 § 222.
99 wickS, e. (2012), p. 214.
100 Pretty v. the UK § 39.
101 Such is the example with the case of Vo v. France, where the ECtHR found no violation of Art. 2 of the 
ECHR.
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individual autonomy and freedom from pain and suffering are potential factors 
capable of establishing an obligation to provide a right to die, it is vital to consider 
human dignity in light of Article 8 of the ECHR.
“It is the treating of an individual as a means to an end to which we object, 
even if it is the individual who has chosen, for good reason, to be so treated.”102
2.2 Human dignity, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and EAD
Article 8(1) of the ECHR states:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.”
Article 8(2) of the ECHR then sets out the restricted situations that allow 
public authorities’ interference with the exercise of the right. The paragraph as-
serts that any interference must be in accordance with the law and necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of several goals, out of which the most 
relevant for the issue of EAD are the protection of health or morals and/or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This right, similar to the right 
to life, mostly gives rise to a negative obligation for States not to interfere with 
one’s right to privacy. Nevertheless, the ECtHR has made it clear that this right 
also requires a positive obligation from the States.103 One important difference 
is that, unlike what was previously said about the human dignity as part of the 
right to life, the right to respect for private life has much more of an individualistic 
approach towards dignity.
To begin with, the nature of the right is said to be centred around the human 
being as an individual and an autonomous subject who is absolutely sovereign 
over her or himself and all of her or his actions that do not interfere with others.104 
As such, this right represents the core of the liberal idea of freedom, and the 
ECtHR has persistently promoted it in that manner in its jurisprudence. In Peck 
v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR emphasized that “private life is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition”,105 and that as such it develops together 
with society’s pressing needs. Considering that EAD has been actualized in the 
102 Immanuel Kant as cited in wickS, e. (2012), p. 213.
103 ziemeLe i. (2009) § 2.
104 Ibid. § 1.
105 Peck v. the UK, 44647/98, ECtHR, 28 January 2003 § 57.
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last 15 to 20 years, with the Netherlands becoming the first country to legalize 
EAD only in 2002,106 the ‘right to die’ can be regarded as a pressing need, able 
to fit under the developing concept of privacy. Even more so if one bears in 
mind that the case of X and Y v. The Netherlands highlighted that physical and 
psychological integrity of a person constitute a part of the right to respect for 
private life.107 As previously explained, the argument that people’s physical and 
psychological integrity demands legalization of the EAD is very often used by the 
proponents of the EAD to establish a positive obligation for the States.
Furthermore, the ECtHR acknowledged that the right to personal autonomy 
and self-determination, which includes the right to make decisions about one’s 
body and the option to choose death over life, also fits under Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR.108 Even though this might seem like EAD has already found its place in 
the ECHR, it should be noted that not all interferences with the right to privacy 
amount to a violation of the ECHR.109 This means that the ECtHR may still al-
low for interference as long as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the ECHR, 
namely “...justified on account of a legitimate aim that it pursued and, on the 
balance, was not disproportionate.”.110 Taking into consideration that some of 
the arguments of the opponents of EAD, such as protection of the sanctity of life, 
could be construed as a legitimate aim, it is hard to predict at this stage whether 
EAD can be protected under Article 8 of the ECHR. This is particularly so be-
cause the ECtHR would consider the absence of a European consensus on the 
regulation of EAD and may review the question of where to strike the balance 
only within the MoA of the concerned State.111 On the other hand, the wide MoA 
might be narrowed down if one takes into account that personal autonomy and 
self-determination are particularly intimate aspects of private life.112 This means 
that with the notions of human dignity and individual autonomy, the EAD debate 
is fully encompassed under Article 8 of the ECHR.
Ultimately, the breadth of the right to respect for private and family life and 
the ECtHR jurisprudence on this Article make it difficult to ascertain which ele-
ments should prevail in the balancing exercise between the personal autonomy 
and the legitimate aims for interference.113 This leads to potential uncertainty as 
to the obligations arising from Article 8 of the ECHR and puts States in a position 
106 maRtin, S. S. (2018), p. 244.
107 X and Y v. the Netherlands, 8978/80, ECtHR, 26 March 1985 §§ 22-30.
108 Pretty v. the UK §§ 61 & 67.
109 ziemeLe i. (2009) § 26.
110 Ibid. § 26.
111 This was the situation in Evans v. the UK, 6339/05, ECtHR, 10 April 2007 §§ 61 & 68.
112 Thus, the MoA shall be narrower. Dudgeon v. the UK, 7525/76, ECtHR, 22 October 1981 § 52.
113 moReham, n. a. (2008) p. 45.
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to stick with the negative obligations and to implement only the steps that are 
more predictable and that do not require additional effort.114
To be specific, the ECtHR follows three simple steps where the negative obli-
gations are at stake.115 Primarily, the obligation of the State is not to interfere with 
the right to respect for private life and to respect the autonomy of the person in 
question. Once the State has interfered, the Court examines whether there has 
been interference with one of the rights specified in Article 8(1) as step number 
two, and if the answer is positive, it analyses the justification or the non-justifica-
tion of the interference as step number three.116 The justification is assessed on 
the basis of Article 8(2), and thus it must be in accordance with the law,117 serve 
one of the legitimate aims,118 and must be necessary in a democratic society.119 
This, with the MoA granted by the ECtHR, makes it easy for States, regardless 
if they have legalized EAD or not, to fulfil the negative obligation as long as they 
follow these steps.
On the other hand, the effective respect for private or family life also requires 
positive obligations from the States, including the adoption of measures to guar-
antee the respect for private life between individuals themselves.120 However, the 
focus on positive obligations is not directly on the precise criteria enumerated in 
Article 8, but on a broader examination into whether Article 8 is applicable and 
if a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests in the case.121 
This makes positive obligations ambiguous and has lead the ECtHR to assert 
that “the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations un-
der Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition”.122 In spite of that, the 
ECtHR has clarified that similar principles are applicable both for negative and 
positive obligations, and that States have to strike a fair balance between the 
general interest and the interests of the individual.123
114 ziemeLe i. (2009) § 42.
115 Moreham distinguishes between two steps only, but that is because she considers the rule for non- 
interference as an inescapable starting point (p. 47). For reasons of clarity, the first step is explained here 
as well.
116 moReham, n. a. (2008), p. 47.
117 Sunday Times v. the UK, 6538/74, ECtHR, 26 April 1979 § 47.
118 The aims might be various due to the broad definition of Art. 8(2). conneLLy, a. m. (1986), pp. 580-583.
119 In other words, this means there must be a pressing social need for the interference. Dudgeon v. the 
UK § 48.
120 Evans v. the UK § 75.
121 Taş kın and Others v. Turkey, 46117/99, ECtHR, 10 November 2004 §§ 111-114.
122 Van Kück v. Germany, 35968/97, ECtHR, 12 June 2003 § 71.
123 Von Hannover v. Germany, 40660/08 & 60641/08, ECtHR, 7 February 2012 § 57.
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“The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dig-
nity and human freedom. […] The notion of personal autonomy is 
an important principle underlying the interpretation of [Convention] 
guarantees.”124
2.3 Comparison of two human dignity perspectives: Article 2 and Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR
The free autonomous human personality is the ultimate manifestation of hu-
man rights values.125 Paradoxically, its beginnings and endings are limited by 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.126 With this in mind, it is 
necessary to base the EAD debate on one of the two previously presented con-
ceptions of human dignity. The choice between general human dignity, innate in 
humanity itself, and specific individual human dignity, centred around the human 
being as a sovereign autonomous subject, will emphasize the specific elements 
of EAD and consequently shall set the ground for this paper to answer the re-
search question.
The human dignity of the person as a sovereign autonomous subject will be 
used as a foundation of the right to respect for private life, and the dignity innate 
in humanity itself shall be used as potential limitation to the right. Nevertheless, 
it is only the individual human dignity that offers an all-inclusive basis for a par-
ticularly intimate aspect of private life such as the decision when and how to die. 
This is so because of the differences between each EAD case, and its numerous 
specifics, which can be covered solely with a type of dignity that perceives the 
human being as a sovereign autonomous subject and that takes the features of 
the individual life as its starting point. Since the dignity behind the right to life is 
based on profound moral values that are inherent to human life generally,127 and 
because that kind of dignity does not include the details of each case,128 the 
ECtHR has already shown that it would not be possible to ground the EAD de-
bate on the human dignity underlying Article 2 of the ECHR.
Namely, the ECtHR has made it clear that Article 2 of the ECHR, togeth-
er with the principles behind it, are not concerned with the quality of living or 
124 Pretty v. the UK §§ 61 & 65.
125 BRemS, e. (2008), pp. 61-63. See also Renz, m. (2015) pp. 28-32.
126 Brems, E. (2008) pp. 65-68.
127 A, B, C v. Ireland §§ 222-225.
128 wickS, e. (2012) pp. 202-203.
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what a person chooses to do with his or her life.129 The Court has stated that 
even though the principle of self-determination is protected under the ECHR,130 
it cannot be read in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to 
choose death rather than life into Article 2, and that protection of the principle 
shall be sought within other rights of the ECHR.131 The ECtHR in its reasoning on 
Article 2 of the ECHR prioritizes the dignity in the form of the principle of sanctity 
of life and does not leave space to interpret EAD as establishing an obligation 
for States to provide a ‘right to die’. Hence, it is safe to conclude that individual 
autonomous choices regarding the end of life would not fit into such a general 
idea of human dignity as provided by Article 2 of the ECHR.
On the other hand, Article 8 of the ECHR protects the individual’s private, as 
well as personal sphere, and covers the notions of human dignity and individual 
autonomy in a manner that offers adequate platform to discuss whether EAD 
can be read into the Convention or not.132 The ECtHR jurisprudence points out 
the reasons as to why the case for EAD would be the strongest under Article 8 
of the ECHR.133 In addition to everything that has been said regarding the case 
of Pretty v. the United Kingdom, in Haas v. Switzerland the Court presumed that 
States “have a positive obligation to adopt measures to facilitate the act of dying 
with dignity”.134 Even though the ECtHR barely assumed that even if there was 
an obligation it would not lead to a violation of the ECHR in the case, it is evident 
from the reasoning that the Court is approaching EAD through the lenses of 
specific individual human dignity.135 For instance, the ECtHR acknowledged the 
importance to end life in a safe manner, without unnecessary pain and suffering, 
to protect the person’s human dignity.136 This example together with the stress-
ing of the non-transferrable137 nature of Article 8 in Koch v. Germany,138 shows 
the individualistic perspective that the Court adopts towards the issue of EAD.
Therefore, the case for EAD fits most appropriately under Article 8 of the 
ECHR and the human dignity perspective that will be taken throughout this pa-
per will mostly be centred on the individual as an autonomous subject who is 
129 Pretty v. the UK § 39.
130 Ibid. § 61.
131 Ibid. § 39.
132 ziemeLe i. (2009) §§ 1-3.
133 Benton, k. (2017).
134 Haas v. Switzerland § 61.
135 Ibid. §§ 50-53. For a broader perspective also see cRiPPen, d. w. (2008).
136 Haas v. Switzerland § 56.
137 Non-transferrable means that this right cannot be pursued by anyone else, in this case a close relative 
or other successor, except for the immediate victim. Koch v. Germany § 79.
138 Ibid. § 79.
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absolutely sovereign over himself/herself and all of his actions that do not inter-
fere with others. Contrastingly, the human dignity illustrated in the principle of 
sanctity of life will be considered as a potential legitimate aim for interference 
with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.
Section 3.  Euthanasia and Assisted Dying in the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights
This section will focus on the case-law related to EAD and it will present 
important findings to display the development of the issue in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.
3.1 Line of development of the issue throughout the cases
Since Pretty in 2002, which was the first case adjudged on merits before 
the Court, the ECtHR has adjudicated four other cases related to the ‘right to 
die’ in the meaning of this paper. In 2011, the ECtHR delivered its judgement in 
Haas v. Switzerland, a case that raised the issue of whether the right to respect 
for private life requires States to ensure a sick person’s wish to end his/her life 
pain-free, and with no risk of failure, without a prescription. Considering that this 
case and Gross v. Switzerland are the only cases against a State which allow for 
some form of EAD, it is important to see the approach towards this issue from 
a viewpoint of a legislation that allows for EAD.139 Gross concerned an elderly 
woman who complained that by denying her the right to decide by what means 
and at what point she died, as someone who was not terminally ill, Switzerland 
had breached her right to respect for private life.
Moreover, the case of Koch v. Germany saw a complaint arguing that the 
domestic courts’ refusal to examine the merits of a request to obtain a deadly 
lethal dose of a drug infringes upon that person’s and his family’s right to respect 
for private and family life. Ergo, the Koch case opens the question of whether 
disallowing the right to EAD to a certain person infringes upon the rights of his/
her close family members as well. 
Lastly, in Lambert and Others v. France in 2015, the Court was deciding 
on an application brought by the parents, a half-brother and a sister of the vic-
tim, who were complaining against a medical report that allowed the State to 
139 PuPPinck g. & de La hougue C. (2014) p. 736.
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discontinue the victim’s artificial nutrition and hydration. Since these are the only 
five merits-based judgements in IHRL, they ought to be briefly considered.
3.1.1 Pretty v. the United Kingdom
This case has been mentioned throughout the paper and its facts have been 
laid out in the introduction. The ECtHR held that the choice to avoid what one 
considers an undignified and distressing end to life falls within the scope of Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR.140 The Court did not exclude that preventing the exercise of 
a choice, to avoid what one considers would be an undignified and distressing 
end to a life, constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life as 
guaranteed under the Convention. Although it undoubtedly established personal 
autonomy as an important principle underlying the guarantees of Article 8 of the 
ECHR,141 the Court found no violation of the ECHR in this case.
3.1.2 Haas v. Switzerland
Mister Haas, the applicant, was a 58 years-old man suffering from a seri-
ous bipolar affective disorder for about twenty years.142 During this period, he 
attempted suicide twice and stayed in psychiatric hospitals on numerous occa-
sions. Maintaining that his illness, for which treatment is difficult, made it impos-
sible for him to live with dignity, the applicant complained that his right to decide 
how and when to end his life, protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, had been 
breached.143 The Court reaffirmed its reasoning given in Pretty,144 and empha-
sized that the fundamental question of the patient’s wish to self-determinedly 
end his or her life in EAD related cases is of general interest because similar 
questions have repeatedly been raised before the ECtHR.145 Additionally, the 
Court further developed the case-law by highlighting once again that an individ-
ual’s right to decide how and when his or her life should end is certainly one of 
the aspects of the right to respect for private life under the ECHR.146 This was 
the first time the ECtHR approached a case related to EAD from the perspec-
tive of a State’s positive obligation to take the necessary measures to permit 
a dignified end of life. As a result, the discussion acknowledged that there is a 
140 Pretty v. the UK § 67.
141 Ibid. § 61.
142 Haas v. Switzerland § 7.
143 Ibid. §§ 32-33.
144 Ibid. § 50.
145 Ibid. § 46.
146 Ibid. § 51.
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positive obligation, and moved from questioning the existence of a ‘right to die’ 
to sole evaluation as to whether the decision to die was taken freely and with full 
understanding of what is involved.147 In the end, the Court concluded that the re-
quirement of a prescription, based on psychiatric assessment, was necessary in 
a system that facilitates access to assisted dying. Since the State must comply 
with the positive obligation to put in place a procedure capable of ensuring that 
a person’s decision to end their life reflects their free will, the interference with the 
right to privacy of the applicant served a legitimate aim and the ECtHR found no 
violation of the Convention.
3.1.3 Koch v. Germany
The applicant was a 69 years-old man who claimed that the refusal to grant 
his late wife permission to acquire a lethal dose of drugs, allowing her to end her 
life, violated both her and his own right to respect for private and family life.148 His 
wife had been suffering from total sensorimotor quadriplegia for several years, 
and the disease had left her completely disabled, in need of artificial ventilation 
and constant assistance from nursing staff.149 Considering that she had a life 
expectancy of at least fifteen more years, she wished to end what was, in her 
view, an undignified life by dying with the applicant’s help.150 Unable to obtain 
the lethal dose of medication in Germany, she was forced to travel to Switzer-
land to end her life.151 The ECtHR recognized the applicant’s legal standing and 
acknowledged that he could claim to have been directly affected by the State’s 
refusal to grant his wife approval to acquire a lethal dose of the medication.152 
However, the acceptance of the fact that the upsetting situation, caused by his 
wife’s unfulfilled wish to commit suicide, had repercussions on his own state 
of health, did not lead the Court to allow him to rely on his wife’s ‘right to die’ 
because of the non-transferable nature of the right.153 Even though the Court 
re-established the reasoning given in Pretty and Haas, it did not add much to 
the EAD case-law as it mostly discussed the procedural aspects of Article 8 of 
the ECHR.  Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that the domestic courts’ refusal 
to examine the applicant’s complaints on the merits constituted a violation of his 
147 Ibid. § 53.
148 Koch v. Germany § 3.
149 Ibid. § 8.
150 Ibid. § 8.
151 Ibid. § 12.
152 Ibid. §§ 43-44.
153 Ibid. § 81.
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right to respect for private life under the ECHR.154 On the other hand, the Court 
refused to examine if the rights of his wife had been violated and rejected that 
part of the application as being incompatible ratione personae with the provi-
sions of the ECHR.155
3.1.4 Gross v. Switzerland
Ms. Gross, the applicant, was an 80 year-old woman who alleged that her 
right to decide how and when to end her life had been breached in contravention 
to Article 8 of the ECHR.156 Even though the Chamber’s decision found a viola-
tion of the right to respect for private life,157 and the reasoning could have notably 
developed the case-law regarding the EAD related positive obligations,158 the 
Grand Chamber later declared the application inadmissible due to the death of 
the applicant. The Court concluded that by taking special precautions to avert 
the disclosing of the information about her death to her counsel, and to the 
Court, the applicant had intended to mislead the Court on a very important mat-
ter of her complaint in order to prevent the discontinuing of the proceedings in 
this case.159 Thus, the Court declined to examine the EAD issue in general and 
failed to add much to the case-law on this matter.
3.1.5 Lambert and Others v. France
The applicants were all relatives to Vincent Lambert, a man in his late thirties 
who sustained serious head injuries in a road-traffic accident that left him tetra-
plegic and in a chronic vegetative state.160 Although this case is related to EAD, 
its features have little to do with the issue and the Court is mostly dealing with 
life-sustaining treatment. Nevertheless, the ECtHR highlighted once again that in 
the sphere that concerns the end of life, including EAD, States must be afforded 
a certain MoA, and strengthened the States’ position to establish the patient’s 
wishes in accordance with national law.161
154 Ibid. § 72.
155 Ibid. § 82.
156 Gross v. Switzerland § 3.
157 Gross v. Switzerland C § 69.
158 Ibid. §§ 62-69.
159 Gross v. Switzerland GC § 36.
160 Lambert and Others v. France § 11.
161 Ibid. § 144.
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3.2 Current standing of EAD in the jurisprudence
The existing situation before the ECtHR in relation to EAD is evidentially 
dominated by the MoA granted to the States on this issue. The Court’s ap-
proach is based on the national legislation on EAD and it only considers the 
obligations arising from that State’s (non) regulation of EAD. This means that the 
Court leaves each State’s authorities to take a stance and offers every society 
room for a change within the national dialogue. Nonetheless, the ECtHR agreed 
on several elements, that might pave the way towards the recognition of EAD as 
a separate right for the terminally ill to choose when and how to die under Article 
8 of the ECHR.
3.3 Concluding observations
The ECtHR is reluctant to find violations of Article 8 in EAD related cases. 
Despite that, it has been slowly developing the issue of EAD as a notion that 
might give rise to positive obligations under the ECHR in certain scenarios. The 
Court has declared both, regulations that allow for EAD, as well as the ones that 
do not, to be in compliance with their obligations under the ECHR due to the 
wide MoA grounded on the absence of a European consensus on the issue of 
EAD. However, it remains to be seen whether this MoA can be narrowed down in 
accordance with the nature of EAD and the importance of the interests at stake 
in cases regarding EAD.
Section 4.  Reading Euthanasia and Assisted Dying into Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights
At this stage it is indisputable that EAD are covered under Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR. Yet, the EAD’s falling within the scope of the Article would fail to establish 
a ‘right to die’ if the exception-clause in Article 8(2) would, as a rule, allow gov-
ernments to prohibit the exercise of EAD under the right to respect for private 
life. In other words, if the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ were to prevail as a le-
gitimate aim, that always permits interference with a terminally ill person’s right to 
choose when and how to die, EAD would remain an unfeasible option from the 
ECHR perspective. This section will consider everything that was discussed so 
far in the paper, to investigate the extent to which EAD can, or cannot, be read 
into Article 8 of the ECHR. Ergo, the research question will mostly be answered 
here, and the scene will be set for drawing together the final observations.
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4.1 Coherence between human dignity and the right to respect for 
private life
In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to test the coher-
ence of the Article and its limitations,162 to see if the notion of human dignity 
inclines towards the legalisation of EAD.163
Acknowledging the general problems and constrictions of the ‘legitimate 
aim’ test in the ECtHR case-law,164 this part will focus solely on ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ clause because of its relevance for the paper.165 The broad-
ness of the clause generally, and especially in relation to EAD,166 gives rise to the 
same weaknesses that have been studied as one element of the extensive cri-
tique of the ‘right and freedoms of others’ by Jacco Bomhoff. Bomhoff  criticizes 
the Court’s use of the clause because:
“a) [the ECtHR] is not clear about the kinds of rights that could 
qualify for inclusion under ‘the rights of others’, (b) is often vague 
about which of those rights precisely is at issue in specific cases, 
and (c) does not apply a consistent category to who can qualify 
as rights holders – i.e. who can be ‘others’ for the purposes of the 
clause.”167
The Court’s reasoning implies that the limitations in EAD related cases are 
always based only on “the rights and freedoms of others”.168 The Court’s reliance 
on the MoA in EAD related cases is often cursory and based only on the absence 
of a European consensus on the matter. This undermines the consideration of 
the nature of a potential right to EAD because it overlooks the substantive part 
of the discussion and the importance of the interests at stake.
Considering that these remarks are relevant to test the coherence between 
Article 8 of the ECHR and human dignity, it is necessary to apply these questions 
to the findings of the second and the third section, and, based on that, to ana-
lyse the MoA that should be granted to the States.  
162 heSteR, d. m. (2010) pp. 67-68.
163 Smith, S. w. (2012).
164 For a general critique of the ‘legitimate aim’ test, see BRemS, e. (ed.) (2008).
165 The paper will be mostly relying on one chapter from Brems’s book, see BomhoFF, J. (2008).
166 The matter is more complicated regarding EAD because one of the rights at stake is the right to life, 
which is a precondition for the enjoyment of all the other rights.
167 BomhoFF, J. (2008) p. 5.
168 Pretty v. the UK § 69 excludes the other limitations grounds.
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4.2 Human dignity and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’
The general criticism about the Court not being clear about what qualifies 
for inclusion under the clause is partly applicable to the issue of EAD. While the 
Court should have been more explicit in showing the links between human digni-
ty, as an underlying notion, and Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the ECHR,169 it is evident 
that in EAD cases the potential interference with the right to respect for private 
life concerns the protection of life.170 Although most of the specifics regarding 
this protection, for example if it is inclusive of maintaining life artificially, remain 
undefined and the ECtHR sometimes deals with it by granting too wide of a 
MoA,171 the limitation has been consistently followed in the jurisprudence. This, 
together with the broadness of what is considered to be a legitimate ground for 
limitation under this clause,172 qualifies the right to life to be part of ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ in EAD related cases.
More importantly, the ECtHR failed to make the distinction as to whether ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’ in EAD cases are merely protecting the right to life 
of the patients or subsequently all the other rights that stem from the ECHR but 
are preconditioned by safeguarding life.173 The Court, by not being clear which 
of those rights precisely are at issue in EAD specific cases under ‘the rights 
of others’, makes harder the prediction of the obligations arising for the states 
under the ECHR in this aspect. Nonetheless, the reasoning in Pretty and Haas 
indicates that the ECtHR focuses solely on protecting the right to life as an ele-
ment of the rights and freedoms of others.174 Considering that the whole process 
of EAD is based on human autonomy, and that the right to life does not invoke 
a correlative obligation to live, as this would contradict human autonomy,175 it is 
questionable who are the ‘others’ whose rights are being protected at the ex-
pense of one’s right to private life.
Namely, the right to life under the ECHR does not require the States to 
protect a person’s life against his or her will by penalizing suicide or EAD.176 
169 For example, in § 65 of Pretty, the Court could have elaborated how States can make sure that human 
dignity is not infringed when protecting Art. 8(2) of the ECHR.
170 Lambert and Others v. France § 148.
171 For example, the Court has consistently failed to explain why the absence of a European consensus 
is more relevant than the intimate aspect of private life (at stake in EAD cases) when deciding the breadth 
of the MoA.
172 BomhoFF, J. (2008), p. 6.
173 The Court did not discuss the clause at all in Gross v. Switzerland and Lambert and Others v. France.
174 Pretty v. the UK § 69 & Haas v. Switzerland § 46.
175 PeteRSen n. (2012) § 13.
176 First and second section of this paper.
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Consequently, the individual consenting to undergo EAD cannot constitute the 
‘others’ in question and it is necessary to examine the cases explained in section 
three to understand the Court’s reasoning in this regard. Neither of the five cases 
can provide a straightforward answer for the EAD cases to resolve this general 
weakness of the ‘legitimate aim’ test, but the interpretation of the ECtHR claims 
leads to the conclusion that the category of people who might be willing to un-
dergo EAD represent the ‘others’ as a group.177 Specifically, the Court finds the 
interference in EAD cases to be justified as “necessary in a democratic society” 
for the protection of the right to life of the weak and vulnerable people who might 
not be in a condition to take informed decisions on acts intended to end their 
lives through EAD.178 Even though the Court did a poor job explaining the basis 
of this qualification, it is a plausible assumption that many of these people might 
be in a vulnerable position,179 and that there are clear risks of abuse of EAD.180
However, from the adopted ‘individual’ human dignity perspective, the 
ECtHR concerns about the vulnerability of the group and the potential abuse of 
EAD are merely an ‘interest’ that ought to be taken into account.181 Autonomous 
and sovereign individuals have the interest to ensure that their decision to un-
dergo EAD is fully independent and that they are protected from abuse, but they 
can ensure that these conditions are satisfied through safeguards and protective 
procedures. In other words, this interest cannot construe a legitimate aim under 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR to justify the interference with the right to respect for 
private life as long as there are strict national safeguards and protective proce-
dures in place. The ECtHR, in its reasoning so far, has framed the EAD issue as 
a conflict between two rights – the right to respect for private life,182 and the right 
to life,183 rather than as a reconcilable divergence between a right to privacy and 
an interest. This approach has so far kept the EAD debate on a European level 
at a stalemate and has been criticized as too broad.184
177 Pretty v. the UK §§ 69, 74, 76 & 78.
178 Ibid. § 74.
179 BRoom, a. (2016) pp. 105-107.
180 montgomeRy J. (2013) pp. 43-44.
181 These concerns represent an ‘interest’ in the setting of the paper, in other situations the same con-
cerns might produce a different outcome, see Keenan v. the UK, 27229/95, ECtHR, 3 April 2001, where 
the applicant was a prisoner in full control of the State.
182 ECHR, Art. 8(1).
183 Expressed as legitimate aim under Art. 8(2) of the ECHR in the form of rights and freedoms of others.
184 The critique is not EAD – specific, but more general for this limitation clause; see BomhoFF, J. (2008), 
pp. 28-29.
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Although the distinction between a right and an interest within the ECHR 
framework is subtle, it is, nevertheless, very important for the EAD discussion.185 
Whilst the rights are enumerated in the Articles throughout the ECHR, the inter-
ests can be identified only by careful exploration of the Article and the circum-
stances of a particular case.186 With regards to EAD, the protection of the right 
to respect for private life is guaranteed under Article 8 of the ECHR.187 On the 
other hand, one’s interest for his or her decision to undergo EAD to be fully in-
dependent, and protected from abuse, stems from the Court’s perception of the 
vulnerability of the group of people that are considering EAD as an option.188 The 
unequivocal use of the term ‘rights’ rather than ‘interests’ in the limitation clause, 
and the “presumption in favour of fundamental rights protection inherent in the 
whole set-up of the Convention”,189 suggest that from an ‘individual’ human dig-
nity perspective, the conflict in question is not between two rights. Even less so 
because the conflict can be prevented, as the vulnerability danger and the risks 
of abuse can be countered by strong safeguards so that most of the arguments 
against EAD become obsolete.190
Therefore, it is desirable from a human dignity perspective, centred around 
the individual as an autonomous subject who is absolutely sovereign over him-
self and all of his actions that do not interfere with others, to read EAD into 
Article 8 of the ECHR. This should be done only if strict national safeguards and 
protective procedures are in place and if the ECtHR makes clear the relationship 
between the right to respect for private life and the limitation clauses, as well as 
between ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ and other clauses. That way the 
Court will ensure the protection of the right to EAD, avoid the chance of a con-
vergence of potentially applicable grounds for limitation of the right to respect for 
private life, and limit the MoA by emphasizing the intimate aspects of the right to 
EAD and the personal autonomy.191
185 Ibid., p. 5.
186 Guide on Article 8 of the ECHR § 97.
187 Second section of this paper.
188 Third section of this paper.
189 BomhoFF, J. (2008), p. 6.
190 This could be countered with arguments on religious or other grounds like the ones set out in gReen-
StReet, w. (2016). The section does not cover the counter-arguments on religious and/or other non-legal 
grounds because they fall outside of the scope of this paper.
191 There is virtually an absolute consensus between the Member-States of CoE that suicide should be 
(and is) legal, and no punishment is prescribed for people who attempt suicide. Cyprus is the only country, 
out of 47, where suicide is still a punishable offence. See miShaRa, B. L., & weiSStuB, d. n. (2016) pp. 55-56.
147VOLUME III \ n.º 1 \ janeiro 2019
The Right to Die – Euthanasia and Assisted Dying Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights \ Vildan Drpljanin
4.3 Interpretation of the right to respect for private and family life 
The primary purpose of the Convention system, including Article 8, is to 
provide individual relief and to raise the general standard of protection of human 
rights throughout the community of the Convention States.192
EAD related cases concern personal autonomy and the self-determination 
principle,193 both of which are important interests that could be deemed ‘es-
sential aspects’ of private life.194 These concerns give rise to a very narrow and 
precise obligation for States to provide the terminally ill people, who are suffering 
unbearable pain, with an option to decide when and how to die in a dignified 
manner.195 The nature of the personal autonomy and the self-determination prin-
ciple, as well as the narrow and precise obligation they impose on States, put 
the ECtHR in a good position to read EAD into the ECHR within the MoA of 
the States.196 Even though the absence of a European consensus is a relevant 
factor that might demand a wide MoA, the Margin could be significantly nar-
rowed down due to the important facet of one’s identity that is at stake in EAD 
cases.197 More to the point, if the Court was to look deeper into the absence of 
a consensus, and if it decided to analyse the principles underlying EAD instead 
of the sole examination of EAD as a process, it would come to the conclusion 
that States have a lot more in common than perceived. Namely, the almost ab-
solute consensus on the legality of suicide in Europe indicates that States are in 
an agreement regarding the definite protection of personal autonomy and self- 
-determination,198 the very same principles that underlie EAD. The fact that several 
countries have systems in place that allow EAD for many years now, makes it 
easier for the ECtHR to guide States as to how to ensure at least the minimum 
degree of protection to terminally ill individuals.
The Court has already paved the way, albeit only to some extent, for a recog-
nition of a right to EAD under the Convention, and nothing of the previously said 
under this part contradicts the findings of the EAD case-law elaborated in the 
third section. The right to respect for private life, as a broad concept insuscepti-
ble of exhaustive definition,199 imposes on States a positive obligation to “secure 
to their citizens the right to effective respect for their physical and psychological 
192 Konstantin Markin v. Russia, 30078/06, ECtHR, 22 March 2012 § 89.
193 Parrillo v. Italy, 46470/11, ECtHR, 27 August 2015 § 159.
194 X and Y v. the Netherlands § 27.
195 Concluding observations of section 3 of this paper.
196 Guide on Article 8 of the ECHR §§ 3-7.
197 X and Y v. the Netherlands § 24.
198 miShaRa, B. L., & weiSStuB, d. n. (2016), pp. 57-58.
199 Peck v. the UK § 57.
148 VOLUME III \ n.º 1 \ janeiro 2019
DOUTRINA
integrity”.200 Since it has already been established that the right to decide the 
manner of one’s death is an element of a person’s physical and psychological 
integrity as long as the decision is freely formed on the basis of the person’s own 
judgement,201 EAD ought to be protected under this right. Accordingly, the Court 
‘can’ read Article 8 to impose on the States a procedural obligation,202 to make 
available a remedy requiring the domestic courts to look into the merits of the 
claim that absolute prohibition of EAD violates the right to respect for private life.
4.4 Desirability of the developments
Expanding the States’ positive obligations in this way might be perceived as 
too forceful by the States opposing EAD. Nonetheless, if the Court was to leave 
things to develop at its current pace, for a lot of people that would mean denial 
of a choice that they perceive as the only way to preserve their basic human 
dignity. IHRL, with an emphasis on human dignity, offers a direction for the moral 
discussion, and a mandate for the ECtHR to call upon states to regulate EAD 
and to help clarify the State’s obligations arising from the ECHR in this aspect. 
States that intend to keep their blanket bans on EAD might subject their citizens 
to additional costs and troubles by leaving them no other choice but to travel 
to another country that allows for EAD. In the worst-case scenarios, this might 
bring applications for inhuman or degrading treatment before the ECtHR,203 and 
may put the Court in a position to weigh completely different interests.
4.5 Concluding observations
The coherence between human dignity and the right to respect for private 
and family life opens questions about the Court’s reasoning in the current EAD 
related case-law. The source of the problem seems to be the ECtHR framing 
of the conflict, which is presented as a clash between the right to respect for 
private life and the right to life, while it actually is a confrontation between the 
right to respect for private life and the interest to prevent abuses and to acknowl-
edge the vulnerability of the group. Since ‘individual’ human dignity emphasizes 
200 Odièvre v. France, 42326/98, ECtHR, 13 February 2003 § 42.
201 Haas v. Switzerland § 51.
202 ECHR, Art. 1. This means that the procedural obligation is essentially also a substantive one by proxy, 
as absolute bans, without considering an individual situation, would not be acceptable.
203 ECHR, Art. 3.
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personal autonomy, and the sole characterization of the protection of EAD as a 
‘right’ trumps mere ‘interests’, it is possible from that perspective to read EAD 
into Article 8 of the ECHR. Even more so because the interests can be recon-
ciled with the right to respect for private life by putting strict national safeguards 
and protective procedures in place. This all can be done through the ECtHR cur-
rent interpretation methods and case-law because autonomy and the self-de-
termination principle are ‘essential aspects’ of private life that give rise to a very 
narrow and precise obligation for States that significantly narrows the MoA.204
Conclusion
“Death is not the greatest of evils: it is worse to want to die, and not be 
able to”
Sophocles (497/6 - 406/5 BC)205
This paper has explored whether Sophocles’ claim inspires a legal obliga-
tion for the States to facilitate the wish of terminally ill people, who experience 
grievous physical or mental pain and suffering, to die with dignity. The process 
of EAD has been critically assessed from the standpoint of human dignity to see 
if, based on the literature and the developments in national and international ju-
risprudence, it can be read into the ECHR. Considering all the provided informa-
tion, the conclusion will draw together the final observations to show how these 
findings require a change in the legal status quo of EAD.
Current standing of the issue 
At present, the legal status of EAD under the ECHR is ambiguous, with lim-
ited space for the process to give rise to positive obligations for States. Some 
Member-States of the CoE allow EAD, but assisting or encouraging suicide re-
mains a criminal offence in most of the European countries. The absence of a 
consensus has so far led the ECtHR to grant a wide MoA, which encompassed 
all the contrasting solutions and did not impose any positive obligations on the 
States except for the ones they were already willing to undertake by their national 
204 The ECtHR can leave open the selection of safeguards and protective procedures, as long as they 
can ensure the protection from abuse and that the decision is not based on the vulnerability of the person. 
These might include but should not be limited to: investigations of the patient’s psyche, the family dynamics 
and the death’s financial implications.
205 daniSh, x (2011) p. 152.
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laws. This is problematic from a human dignity perspective because it brings 
uncertainty into the relationship between personal autonomy and the sanctity of 
life, and thus necessitates serious consideration as to whether the ECHR could 
unify these diverging views.
While at first sight EAD could potentially fit into the scope of several Articles 
of the ECHR, the particularly intimate character of the decision when and how 
to die requires the safeguarding of human dignity that incorporates all the cir-
cumstances of the process. The two ECHR broad conceptions of ‘general’ and 
‘individual’ human dignity point towards Article 2 and Article 8 of the ECHR re-
spectively, as the most plausible grounds that could establish a potential ‘right to 
die’. Since the ‘general’ human dignity, innate in humanity itself, is not concerned 
with the quality of living or what a person chooses to do with his or her life, and 
mostly ignores personal autonomy, it would be hard to read EAD into Article 2 of 
the ECHR. On the other hand, the ‘individual’ human dignity, focused around the 
human being as an autonomous subject who is sovereign over his or her body 
and actions, is the foundation of Article 8 of the ECHR, and the dignity innate in 
humanity itself can be construed as a potential limitation to the Article. Hence, 
the ‘individual’ human dignity and Article 8 of the ECHR incorporate both the 
principle of personal autonomy and the principle of sanctity of life and imply that 
the EAD debate should be approached from the ‘individual’ dignity perspective. 
These reasons, together with the Court’s individualistic approach towards the 
issue of EAD, show that Article 8 of the ECHR is best suited to protect human 
dignity in EAD related cases and that it is the strongest ground for the ‘right to 
die’ case under the ECHR.
The ECtHR has only had a limited chance thus far to discuss the issue in 
its jurisprudence as it has adjudicated only five EAD related cases, with three of 
them providing at best moderate contributions to the analysis.206 Despite that, 
the Court has managed to develop the issue of EAD as a notion that might give 
rise to positive obligations under the ECHR in certain scenarios. It has recog-
nized personal autonomy as the principle underlying the guarantees of Article 
8 of the ECHR, and it has acknowledged that the choice to avoid what one 
considers an undignified and distressing end to life falls within the scope of the 
Article. These findings, together with the Court’s willingness to analyse positive 
obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR in EAD related cases, form a solid start-
ing point to establish a ‘right to die’. Nonetheless, the ECtHR needs to go one 
step further to narrow down the MoA granted to States in order to ensure the 
access to EAD to those in pain wishing to choose when and how to die.
206 Koch v. Germany, Gross v. Switzerland & Lambert and Others v. France.
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The desirable outcome
The ECtHR could move towards explicitly invoking a positive obligation, one 
which obliges States to provide the possibility of EAD, if it was to properly frame 
the conflict between the principle of self-determination and the principle of sanc-
tity of life under Article 8 of the ECHR. If the Court’s reasoning was to be in line 
with the coherence behind human dignity and the right to respect for private and 
family life in cases related to the issue, it could read EAD to a certain extent into 
Article 8 of the ECHR.
The EAD debate under the ECHR is presented as a clash between the right 
to respect for private life and the right to life. If that was the case, it would have 
been appropriate to endorse the Court’s approach to the issue and commend 
it to continue. However, since the right to life under the ECHR does not contain 
a correlative obligation to live, the Court’s approach is rather misleading. This 
is supported by the interpretation of the ECtHR and the European states who 
almost uniformly agree that committing suicide is not a punishable offence and 
that permission of suicide does not violate the States’ obligation under Article 
2 of the ECHR. Consequently, the State’s ambition to preserve the life of the 
person choosing to undergo EAD is merely an interest to that person to prevent 
abuses and to acknowledge the vulnerability of his or her group contrasted to 
that individual’s right to respect for private life.
Thus, when presented as a conflict between the right to respect for private 
life and the interest to prevent abuses and to acknowledge the vulnerability of the 
group, it is the right that should prevail. Nonetheless, the gravity of the interest 
should not be undermined and EAD should be read into Article 8 of the ECHR 
only if strict national safeguards and protective procedures are in place. EAD 
can be read into Article 8 of the ECHR through the ECtHR current interpretation 
methods and case-law because personal autonomy and the self-determination 
principle are ‘essential aspects’ of private life. These aspects give rise to a very 
narrow and precise obligation for States that significantly narrows the MoA. 
Thus, IHRL, with an emphasis on human dignity, offers a direction for the moral 
discussion, and a mandate for the ECtHR to call upon states to regulate EAD.
Bearing in mind all the legal issues this paper has touched upon in the at-
tempt to contribute useful insight as to how the ECtHR should approach this top-
ic, a summarized answer to the main research question would be the following:
EAD can, based on feasibility from a human dignity perspecti-
ve, current interpretation methods and case-law, be read into Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR to the extent one’s decision to undergo EAD is 
in compliance with all the safeguards and it is freely formed solely 
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on the grounds of the person’s own judgement and inasmuch strict 
protective procedures are in place.
Insofar as these conditions are satisfied, the respect of individual bodily and 
mental autonomy, in terms of the definitions provided in the intro, must be a 
sine qua non for human dignity in relation to the ‘right to die’ under the ECHR. 
Accordingly, state obligations shall be construed around the notion of personal 
autonomy to provide people with a protection of the ‘last’ right.
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